Gregory L. Rivera v. Jean M. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987)

CASE: Paternity suit (child born out of wedlock).

FACTS: Minnich sues Rivera for child support for her child born out of wedlock. Before the trial, Rivera requested that the court rule that the statutory burden of proof of paternity (preponderance of the evidence) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Trial court denied motion; jury finds that Rivera is the father of the child and orders him to pay child support; trial judge reconsidered his ruling on the burden of proof issue and granted the defendant a new trial; plaintiff appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that the statute is constitutional and reinstated the jury's verdict; defendant appeals to the SupCo.

QUESTION: Whether a determination of paternity by a preponderance of the evidence complies with the Due Process Clause.

PLAINTIFF ARGUES:

The standard of proof required by the Court's holding in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), to terminate the parent-child relationship is also constitutionally required to create it. Rather, the Constitution requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.

COURT SAYS: Affirms Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling reinstating the verdict.

HOLDING: Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to a determination of paternity complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

RATIONALE: There are significant differences between the state's imposition of the legal obligations accompanying a biological relationship between parent and child and the state's termination of a fully existing parent-child relationship.

1. There is an important difference between the ultimate results in a judgment in the two proceedings: in a paternity action, the primary interest is avoiding having to pay support whereas, in a termination action, the state is seeking to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship. Because termination is more severe than paternity, its standard of proof should be higher.
2. In a termination proceeding, like in a criminal or civil commitment proceeding, the contestants are the state (with superior resources) and an individual. Because the outcome of these proceedings have especially severe consequences, it is appropriate for society to impose upon itself a disproportionate share of the risk of error. In a paternity action, the parties are roughly equal and would suffer in a similar way the consequences of an adverse ruling. Therefore, it is appropriate that each share equally in the risk of an inaccurate factual determination.
3. The imposition of a higher standard of proof in termination proceedings protects the parents, and to some degree, the child, from renewed efforts to sever their familial ties. In contract, a paternity suit terminates with the entry of a final judgment that bars repeated litigation of the same issue under normal principles of civil litigation.

DISSENT (Brennan): Standard of proof should be higher than preponderance of the evidence because a paternity proceeding implicates significant property and liberty interests of the defendant. It imposes on him a lifetime of support obligation and has the potential to set in motion a process of engagement that is powerful and cumulative, and whose duration spans a lifetime. Furthermore, the losing defendant must also face the social ostracism directed toward a father who tried to shirk his responsibilities. Adding the higher burden of proof does not significantly burden the other party, the child or the state (because of blood-grouping tests, which are accurate).

T O P